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RECENT CASES
the same taxes as privately owned corporations when that
property is not used for strictly charitable purposes,25 the
argument used by the Montana court loses much of its validity.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY USE OF COERCED
CONFESSIONS
After conviction of murder in the first degree for the
killing of a police officer, appellant brought error, charging
that the confession used against him at the trial had been
obtained through coercion and violence and had been incor-
rectly admitted as evidence by the trial court. The undisputed
evidence showed that appellant had been captured soon after
the killing and had been severely beaten by the police who
had arrested him. After the beating he was taken to police
headquarters where he was questioned that night in the pres-
ence of several of the officers who had beaten him. The
confession in controversy followed. At the time appellant
made his confession he had neither been advised of his rights
nor seen his counsel. In reversing the conviction the Indiana
Supreme Court held that the circumstances warranted a find-
ing by the court that the confession had been obtained through
coercion and was therefore inadmissible as evidence. Johnson
v. State, 78 N.E.2d 158 (Ind. 1948).
The problem confronting the court was one of determin-
ing whether the circumstances under which the confession
was secured constituted a denial of due process of law as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment., By reviewing
the means by which this confession was obtained, the court
departed from the precedent set forth by 1revious Indiana
cases which had stated the proposition that the circumstances
attendant upon the securing of a criminal confession are
issues of fact for determination by the trial court only, and
that the findings so made should not be disturbed by appellate
courts.2 The position expressed by the Supreme Court of the
25. City Temple Institutional Society of Denver v. McGuire, 104 Colo.
11, 87 P.2d 760 (1939); Boston Symphony Orchestra v. Board of
Assessors, 294 Mass. 248, 1 N.E.2d 6 (1936).
1. For the most comprehensive treatment of the subject generally
see McCormick, "Some Problems and Developments in the Ad-
missibility of Confessions" 24 Tex. L. Rev. 239 (1946).
2. "This court will not weigh the evidence given in the trial court
upon the competency of the admission in evidence of a written
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United States in a recent series of decisions culminating in
Malinski v. New York 3 and Haley v. Ohio4 was followed. This
doctrine, which held that appellate courts might review the
undisputed facts of the record to determine whether due
process was denied, was established by Chief Justice Hughes 5
to enable the Supreme Court to examine the validity of pro-
tested confessions in the light of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Indiana appellate courts have been reluctant to review
issues of fact upon which the trial court had reached a de-
cision, contending that the direct evidence and testimony
available to the lower court is more likely to create an ac-
curate picture of the situation than is the cold recital of facts
contained in the record before the appellate court.6 The
instant case does not completely discard this theory, for it
indicates that the appellate court may not weigh the probative
effect of conflicting evidence nor make new findings of fact
for itself, but must confine its inquiry to the undisputed
facts as shown by the record. The United States Supreme
Court decisions have all been based solely on an examination
of the undisputed facts,7 although in each case where testi-
mony was disputed the Court recited the conflicting evidence
before resting its decision on uncontroverted grounds.8 Be-
cause of the difficulty of finding undisputed evidence in all
cases, there has been a marked tendency to require fewer and
confession made by a defendant." Mack v. State, 203 Ind. 355,
374, 180 N.E. 279, 285 (1932); Caudill v. State, 224 Ind. 581 69
N.E.2d 549 (1946); Hawkins v. State, 219 Ind. 116, 37 N.E.2d 79
(1941).
3. 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
4. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
5. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). This was not the
first time this doctrine was proposed, however. In Frank v. Mag-
num, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915), Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting
with then Justice Hughes, said "When the decision of the question
of fact is so interwoven with the decision of the question
of constitutional right that the one necessarily involves the other,
the Federal court must examine the facts."
6. Cox v. State, 49 Ind. 568 (1875); Winslow et al. v. State, 5 Ind.
App. 306 (1892).
7. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401 (1945); Asheraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1943);
Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); White v. Texas, 310 U.S.
530 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
8. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Ten-
nessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1943); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 580 (1940);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
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fewer facts to establish coercion and a denial of due process.9
But where the evidence is entirely conflicting as to whether
the confession is voluntary or not, the appellate court must
accept the findings of the trial court unless by so doing an
obvious injustice would result.10
Each case raising the issue of denial of due process in
the securing of criminal confessions must be considered sep-
arately in the light of its facts, for the Supreme Court has
stated that it is practically impossible to define precisely the
limits of what constitutes a violation of due process through
coercion.:" Coercion itself has been measured subjectively,
the courts basing their findings upon the impact of surround-
ing circumstances on the mind of the defendant. The age,12
race 3 and intelligence of the accused is considered together
with the actual physical or mental strain imposed upon him.
In Lyons v. Oklahomas the Supreme Court ruled that coercive
circumstances leading to one confession do not necessarily
influence a subsequent confession made after these circum-
stances had been removed and the accused advised of his
rights. Applying the above test of measuring the effect of
the intimidating treatment on the mind of the individual to
the instant case, it is readily apparent that the confession was
coerced. The interval between the beating and the time of
the confession was not sufficient to preclude the inference
9. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (brutal physical pun-
ishment); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Ward v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) (instilling a fear of lynching); White
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940) (repeated removal from jail to a
lonely wooded area for purposes of interrogation at night); Ash-
craft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1943) (thirty-six hours of con-
tinuous grilling); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945)
(humiliation while questioning); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596
1948) (five hours questioning).
10. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Lisbena v. California,
314 U.S. 219 (1941). See also the dissenting opinion in Malinski
v. New York in which Chief Justice Stone criticizes the majority
opinion for accepting as testimony the remarks made at the trial
by the prosecuting attorney. Since all the evidence was conflict-
ing, the Court seized upon statements made by the state attorney
in summary and used them as the undisputed facts. 324 U.S.
401, 434 (1945).
11. "No formula to determine this question by its application to the
facts of a given case can be devised." Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322
U.S. 596, 602 (1944).
12. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
13. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S.
547 (1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
14. Lisbena v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
15. 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
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that the effects of the previous beating influenced the con-
fession. Equally significant are the facts that appellant was
not advised of his right to see his counsel until after the con-
fession had been taken, and that the interrogation leading to
the confession was attended by several of the police officers
who had helped administer the beating. Undoubtedly this
contributed to the psychological factors influencing the mind
of the appellant when he made the statement. But illegal
acts committed by police officers in the process of obtaining
a confession are not of themselves a denial of due process.1 6
Other factors must be considered. The illegally obtained
confession must actually be used in evidence against the ac-
cused as a means of obtaining his conviction.Y It is not
necessary, however, that it be the sole evidence leading to the
conviction-the constitutional guarantee makes mandatory a
review of all decisions where the admissibility of a criminal
confession is questioned on due process grounds, even though
the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to warrant
a submission of the case to the jury without the confession.""
In determining this problem the court is not concerned with
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and a just result stem-
ming from an unfair trial is as much a violation of procedural
due process as is an unjust decision.19
Coercion in the securing of a confession which is later
used to convict the accused is a denial of due process. To
this end the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the accused
a fair and impartial trial free from unreliable and improper
evidence.20  The due process clause is satisfied only when
coerced confessions are excluded from admission as evidence
against the accused.
16. Lisbena v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
17. Lisbena v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
18. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma,
322 U.S. 596 (1944); present case at 160.
19. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291- U.S. 97 (1934).
20. Apart from the guarantee of due process a coerced confession
would be held inadmissible as evidence for other reasons. Such
admissions are rarely accurate and are completely unreliable as
a source of competent evidence. 3 Wigmore, "Evidence" §822(3d ed. 1940); 2 Wharton, "Criminal Evidence" §604 (11th ed.
1935).
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